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Heidegger and the Poetics of Time
Rebecca A. Longtin
Heidegger’s engagement with the poet Friedrich Hölderlin often dwells 
on the issue of temporality. In his Beiträge zur Philosophie, Heidegger 
calls Hölderlin “the one who poetized the furthest ahead” and contrasts 
him with his contemporaries, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who at-
tempted to understand all of history in absolute terms (ga 94: 204/143). 
Similarly, in Heidegger’s 1934–35 Freiburg lecture course on Hölderlin’s 
hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” he calls Hölderlin the “most 
futural thinker [zukünftigster Denker]” (ga 39: 5/5). For Heidegger, 
Hölderlin is the furthest ahead of thinkers – a poet who opens new pos-
sibilities for the present. The Beiträge raise the question, “To what ex-
tent does the poet Hölderlin, who has already gone ahead of us, become 
now our necessity, in his most unique poetic experience and work?” 
(ga 94: 353/247). The futural saying of Hölderlin’s poetry makes him 
necessary for us now, and in this sense he belongs to the present time, a 
“destitute time.” Yet Hölderlin also speaks to us from the past. At the 
time Heidegger wrote the Beiträge, the poet had been dead for nearly a 
century, and his poetry was fairly obscure during his own time. It is for 
this reason Heidegger states that we must wrest Hölderin’s poetry “from 
being buried” by the past (ga 94: 204/142–43). Heidegger thus frames 
the poet in the intersection of past, present, and future. Yet Hölderlin’s 
relevance for Heidegger’s thinking of temporality goes deeper than 
these formulations. Namely, Heidegger describes Hölderlin as being 
able to poetize time. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine what it means to poetize 
time and situate this poetic temporality in the context of Heidegger’s 
thinking of time. In doing so, I will attempt to show that thinking about 
time is essentially a poetic task, and one that Hölderlin understands as 
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his poetic vocation. To unravel this poetics of time, I will first lay out 
Heidegger’s thinking of time in relation to Husserl’s concept of inter-
nal time consciousness – and Derrida’s critique of it – to explain the 
strange interface between presence and non-presence that characterizes 
temporality (section I). Whereas Husserl’s concept of time is musical, 
I will suggest that Heidegger’s is essentially poetic. I will then address 
Heidegger’s poetic time in relation to the Es gibt, i.e. the sending of time 
from a groundless and indeterminate source (section II). Both these 
elements, the interplay of presence and non-presence (I) and the send-
ing of time (II), are central to Hölderlin poetry. Lastly, I will address 
how Hölderlin poetizes in order to describe the sense of poetic time that 
resounds in his use of language (III). In doing so, I hope to unearth why 
Heidegger found this poet to be so necessary for his thought.
i . the challenge of thinking time
First we must consider the challenge of thinking time. The common 
sense notion of time, which Heidegger calls “vulgar time” and I will 
call the “naïve concept of time,” envisions temporality as a constant 
stream of now-moments, or “a succession of nows that come into be-
ing and pass away” (ga 2: 558–59/423). This sense of time seems self-
evident but falls apart as soon as we question it further. With the naïve 
concept of time, only the present is real. The past is dead, no longer 
actual, and becomes a mere memory. The future is at worst a mere 
imaginary projection into the unknown and at best a possibility that 
has not yet been realized, but either way is not actual and thus also not 
real. Each now becomes a singular moment. As a result, it is not clear 
how the present relates to past or future if neither is real. By mak-
ing only the present real, this concept of time undermines temporality 
as the interrelation of past, present, and future. Moreover, insisting 
on this stream of nows is thoroughly contradictory because it must be 
understood as uninterrupted and without gaps, which makes the time-
line infinitely divisible like a geometrical line (ga 2: 559/423). Yet if 
time is an infinitely divisible line, then the “now” has no duration, 
so how can a stream of now-moments have any continuity? The now 
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clearly cannot be just now. Heidegger explains, “Every last now, as a 
now, is always already a right-away that is no longer, thus it is time in 
the sense of the no-longer-now, of the past. Every first now is always 
a just-now-not-yet, thus it is time in the sense of the not-yet-now, the 
‘future’” (ga 2: 560/424). Questioning this naïve concept of time shows 
its contradictions – i.e. the now is never just now – and leads us to Hus-
serl’s thinking of time. 
 Husserl describes the structure of time as a continual interplay 
between past, present, and future. Instead of a constant stream of now-
moments, time is like a melody. To hear a melody, a note cannot be a 
singular instant or I would never be able to detect the movement from 
one note to another. To hear melody, I must hear this note in relation to 
the previous one, but I do not need to use my memory to recall the prior 
note. Similarly, I anticipate future notes in a melody. Music continually 
plays with our anticipations or we would not be able to detect patterns, 
like scales or the resolving of a dissonance. In this sense, the tonal mo-
ment cannot be an isolated now. How would we even isolate this “now” 
of the tone – is it a millisecond, a nanosecond, when the finger first 
touches the string, or when the string vibrates in response? We cannot 
divide time this way. 
 Instead, Husserl explains the nature of the present in terms of 
retentions (the just-past) and protentions (the almost-future). Husserl 
states that a “now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of a continuity 
of retentions.”1 A retention is a moment that has just passed – not a 
memory that needs to be recalled from the past – and so it remains tied 
to the now-apprehension. This means the now is not an isolated moment 
but instead a limit that Husserl describes as “the head attached to the 
comet’s tail of retentions.”2 The now-apprehension also anticipates the 
future that is just about to happen, which Husserl calls “protention.” 
Instead of a stream of isolated now moments, the present must bring 
together past and future.
 Compare Figure 1, the naive concept of time as stream of now-
moments with Figure 2, Husserl’s internal time consciousness. In Fig-
ure 1, now-moments lack duration and it is unclear how they form a 
continuum. The past is dead. The future is an imaginary projection. Only 
the present is real. In Figure 2, the line A, B, C, and D represents the
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  figure 1.   Naïve concept of time as stream of now-moments. 
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  figure 2.   Husserl’s internal time consciousness  
          (an edited and expanded version of his diagrams).
A, B, C, D        succession of present      
B* C* D* E* protentions            
A′   retention of  A
A″   retention of retention of A      
A″′   retention of retention of retention of A 
A′–A″′  describes A sinking into the past
   D retains C′, B″, and A″′ and anticipates E.
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succession of the present, or primal impressions. From point A to point 
B, A becomes a retention rather than a primal impression. When B is 
the primal impression, A is a retention and C is a protention. Moving 
to C, B becomes a retention, and A becomes a retention of the retention 
of A. With each successive moment, A retains its previous retention and 
thus fades away into the past.
 Husserl’s account of time, however, overlooks the problem of the 
now-moment. Even though the now-moment is not isolated in his ac-
count, he still has to treat it as a limit. How do we talk about a primal 
impression, except as a limit? Derrida discusses the implications of this 
limit in Speech and Phenomena. As Derrida notes, in Ideas I Husserl 
privileges the present insofar as every experience “is an experience 
according to the mode of ‘being present’… as being certain and pres-
ent.”3 Derrida states that this sense of presence, or self-presence, “must 
be produced in the present taken as a now.”4 But in Husserl’s internal 
time consciousness lectures there is no “now” in this sense. Since the 
“now” is a comet with a tail of retentions and protentions, there is no 
certain and present now. Rather, the now always includes, by necessity, 
a not-now. As Derrida points out:
As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the 
not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of 
primordiality common to primordial impression and 
primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-
identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevi-
dence are admitted into the blink of the instant. There 
is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This 
alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presenta-
tion, and thus for Vorstellung in general….5
In other words, presence necessarily involves nonpresence and other-
ness – which means there is no pure presence. Différance is at the cen-
ter of the now-moment. Thus while Husserl’s musical sense of time 
challenges the naïve notion of time, he fails to recognize its mean-
ing for presence. Presence remains mysterious, not clear or certain, by 
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necessity. Understanding time is a task that must recognize the radical 
non-presence of the present, or the concealment that always remains, 
which is an essential task for poiesis. This appears to be Heidegger’s 
sense of time after the Kehre.
i i . the kehre and the radical non-presence of the present 
In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger’s discussions of time – especially in 
his lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry – present a more radical reworking of 
temporality, one that is poetic rather than musical. It may seem at first 
that Heidegger’s Being and Time merely adopts Husserl’s interweaving 
of past, present, and future and applies it to Dasein, who is stretched 
between birth and death. But Being and Time should not be understood 
in a Husserlian framework because (1) Heidegger does not locate tempo-
rality in consciousness, and (2) Being and Time emphasizes the futural 
in a way that goes far beyond Husserl’s notion of protention.6 Husserl’s 
internal time consciousness replicates some of the qualities of the naïve 
concept of time, the flow from past to present to future, whereas Heid-
egger sees time as coming from the future, not the past. For Heidegger, 
“The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is 
not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future 
that makes present, in the process of having-been” (ga 2: 463/350). The 
future is the origin of time, the source from which the present is made 
present as a past process, the future perfect tense, the will have been that 
enfolds all dimensions of temporality. 
 Moreover, Being and Time already anticipates one of Heidegger’s 
most radical moves in the thinking of time, the Kehre, which was sup-
posed to happen in the infamous missing section “Time and Being.” 
Being and Time is incomplete and, more importantly, is only a prepara-
tion for the fundamental ontology that he hoped would work out “the 
central range of problems of all ontology as rooted in the phenomenon 
of time” (ga 2: 25/18).7 The unpublished section of Being and Time, 
“Time and Being,” was meant to develop this fundamental ontology 
of time through a reversal (Kehre) that would explicate being from 
the standpoint of time; however, Heidegger claimed that he could not 
poetics of time
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 publish it due to his inability to articulate these ideas in any intelligible 
way.8 The end of the second division anticipates this reversal from Be-
ing and Time to “Time and Being,” the move to fundamental ontology, 
which Heidegger describes in a marginal note as an “overcoming of the 
horizon as such. The return into the source. The presencing out of this 
source.”9 We can gather more about this reversal from Heidegger’s later 
writings, which emphasize the withdrawal of this source of presencing. 
 In “A Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1946) Heidegger emphasizes the re-
versal as arriving “at the locality of that dimension out of which Being 
and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental 
experience of the oblivion of being” (ga 9: 328/250). The turn after the 
preliminary analyses of Dasein directs us toward a more fundamental 
experience of being, one of oblivion – or as Heidegger later notes, an 
experience of withdrawal. Withdrawal is neither presence nor absence, 
but the trace of what was present as it returns to its origin from whence 
it was sent. As Richardson notes, the Kehre is distinguished from Heid-
egger’s earlier explanations of time by the “mittence of Being,” the 
sending of being.10 This sending becomes clearer in Heidegger’s even-
tual writing and publishing of “Time and Being” (1962), where he dis-
cusses time in terms of Es gibt (there is, or literally translated it gives).11
 In “Time and Being,” Heidegger explains that Es gibt is the only 
way we can speak about the essence of being and time. Es gibt is the 
groundless ground of both being and time because it is the most funda-
mental idea that we can have. We can say “there is being” and “there is 
time” – even if we can say nothing more. Es gibt sets a limit for thought, 
since what is given comes from a nameless and identity-less “it.” It 
gives, but we have no sense of what this it is. Heidegger explains that 
the “it” in “it gives” is completely undetermined – it is not an object or 
a subject (ga 14: 22–23/17–18). What is given comes from a source that 
we cannot discern. Time and being are characterized by a giving or a 
sending – they are gifts from an unknown and undetermined source 
(ga 14: 10/6). There is no determinate origin of time and being. Time 
has a hidden source that makes what is present deeply ambiguous. The 
Es of Es gibt is a radical non-presence that underlies all presence. 
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 To think time in this way, Heidegger turns to Hölderlin, a poet who 
recognizes this very sense of time: namely, time as it is sent which makes 
the “now” a strange interweaving of presence and non-presence.12 It is 
in Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin that he develops a “poetic 
time” that can overcome the naïve concept of time. 
i i i . hölderlin and the task of poetizing time
Since this paper is far too brief to do justice to the many ways Heidegger 
addresses Hölderlin’s poetizing of time, especially insofar as temporal-
ity is thematic in many of his lecture courses and essays on the poet, 
I will have to summarize only a few of these very rich and suggestive 
passages. I will focus on two aspects of Hölderlin’s poetic time: (A) the 
poetic ‘now’ as ambiguous and mysterious, and (B) the rhythm of his 
poetry insofar as it reflects the relational dynamics of temporality.
a. the poetic now
In Being and Time, Heidegger explains that the vulgar, or naïve, sense 
of time levels the dimensions of temporality in order to reduce it to 
“datability” and treat it as though it were something we can measure. 
Yet if time is temporalized from the future and not the past, it is neither 
datable nor measurable. Heidegger expands on this sense of time in his 
lecture on Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” where he contrasts poetic time with 
calculative approaches to time. Heidegger focuses on the first few lines 
of the poem, “Now come, fire! / Eager are we / To see the day” (Jetzt 
komme, Feuer! / Begierig sind wir / Zu schauen den Tag) (ga 53: 3/2). 
The poet calls to the fire, but not in the sense of commanding it. In-
stead, as Heidegger explains, this is a call for the “coming fire to make 
visible the day” (ga 53: 6/7). The poet calls to what is looming ahead, 
what is already on its way. What kind of ‘now’ belongs to this calling? 
Heidegger describes this ‘now’ as “a star that has suddenly risen and 
that shines over everything” because of its strong and singular intona-
tion (ga 53: 8/8). This ‘now’ resounds, and moreover, “names the time 
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of calling of those who are of a calling, a time of the poets” (ga 53: 8/8). 
For Heidegger, this ‘now’ is a time that calls upon poets to poetize – it 
is a poetic time. He asks, “How can poetizing determine a time, lend 
distinction to a ‘now’?” (ga 53: 8/8). Poetizing, as dichten (from the 
Latin dictare) means “to tell something that, prior to this, has not yet 
been told” (ga 53: 8/8). To poetize is to bring forward a unique begin-
ning, a temporality that “cannot be established in accordance with the 
calendar” or “dated” (ga 53: 8/8). 
 This poetic ‘now’ is not a moment of pure presence, nor something 
we can determine in advance. Heidegger tells us that poetic time is 
“different in each case, in accordance with the essential nature of the 
poetry and the poets” (ga 53: 9/8). Each poet poetizes time anew, po-
etizes as if for the first time. Heidegger sees this sense of a new and 
singular beginning as being particularly true of Hölderlin’s poetry. For 
Heidegger, “the ‘Now come’ appears to speak from a present into the 
future. And yet… it speaks into what has already happened… some-
thing has already been decided,” which he describes as an event of 
appropriation (Ereignis) (ga 53: 9/9). The poet calls what has already 
been decided, what will be made present by the future. The present is 
fulfilled by the future and past, a relational dynamic that elicits won-
der, not calculation. 
 Heidegger situates Hölderlin as someone who can poetize temporal-
ity in an age that only cares to calculate and manage it. As Heidegger 
explains, “the modern era gives rise to the calculation of flux” (ga 
53: 41/49). Time becomes another dimension added to space and, as 
a dimension, is thoroughly calculable (ga 53: 41/49–50). We measure 
time for specific ends and uses. Clocks help us to keep track of time and 
can measure our productivity. Calendars allow for planning. Its calcu-
lability imposes an order that is so useful it becomes unquestionable. 
In the end, this clarity of calculation means that we no longer feel the 
need to think about time. This calculative approach, however useful it 
is, treats time as an object (Gegenstand) that stands apart from us as 
subjects. Heidegger does not think we can approach time in this way 
(ga 53: 45/55). Heidegger explains that this notion does not make sense 
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as space and time are the conditions that make experience possible. 
Yet space and time cannot be “merely a subjective representation” or a 
construct that is proper only to the subject (ga 53: 46/56). We experi-
ence space and time in terms of objects. Thus space and time are not 
simply objects apart from us or subjective constructs that have nothing 
to do with the world. This issue leads to the significant conclusion that 
“whatever the case, they are something that cannot be accommodated 
within the schema of ‘either objective’ – ‘or subjective’” (ga 53: 46/56). 
The poetic experience of space and time thus must defy the distinction 
of subject and object and instead opens up a new, more fundamental re-
lation. For this reason, the clarity and success of calculative approaches 
to time oppose the wandering, reflective way in which that poetry en-
gages with time. Poetry provides a “mediation on the essence of time,” 
which “accomplishes nothing in terms of improving our apparatus for 
measuring time” (ga 53: 42/50). Poetry treats time as something mys-
terious that outruns any effort to subordinate it to our uses. 
 This sense of the “now” as incalculable and mysterious in its inter-
weaving of future and past is very apparent in Heidegger’s 1944 lecture 
course on Hölderlin and Nietzsche. In this lecture course, Heidegger 
describes what is present as a “leap out of the facing approach” be-
tween the future (Zukunft) and origin (Herkunft) (ga 50: 146/51). The 
future (Zukunft) means to come (kommen) to (zu). The origin (Herkunft) 
means to come (kommen) from (her). Temporality moves to and from 
the present. As Heidegger explains, “What is present only exists as the 
alternating transition of what is to come into what was and of what was 
into what is to come. Therefore, every present moment is an ambigu-
ous ambiguity” (ga 50: 146/51). This ambiguity of the present moment 
seems profoundly poetic, especially when we consider poiesis as a mode 
of revealing that preserves concealment. This present for Heidegger 
is ambiguous. He explains it by noting that “this ambiguity stems di-
rectly from what exceeds the present and what exists more so than does 
the present” (ga 50: 146/51). The present is not real in this sense, but 
an open for the past and future that exceed it. The “now” is a strange 
interface between past and future that is filled by what is more than 
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present, by what is excessive.13 We see this tension and ambiguity in 
Hölderlin’s poetry, especially in the gods, who are “nothing other than 
time” (ga 39: 55/53). The gods are time, a time that has its own mea-
sure, a different measure than calculative time. The gods are neither 
fully present nor fully absent in Hölderlin’s poetry, because they have 
fled leaving only traces.14 
     from               to              from               to
 from (her)      to (zu)
        origin      future
 (Herkunft)      (Zukunft)
                 present
  figure 3.  Attempt to visualize Heidegger’s description of time in ga 50.
 
 Temporality interweaves presence and absence so that they form a 
necessary relation. The past is not dead, nor the future foreign – both 
give birth to the present, revealing what is concealed but not making 
it fully present. This temporality, moreover, is not only present in what 
Hölderlin’s poetizes but also how he poetizes. His poetry is sensitive to 
time in every syllable, meter, and dramatic crescendo. 
b. hölderlin’s rhythm and the fullness of time
Wilhelm Dilthey’s essay on Hölderlin (1906/1910) provides one of the 
first philosophical commentaries on the poet and is especially relevant 
here since it focuses on the temporal aspects of his poetry. Dilthey’s 
Hölderlin essay is particularly helpful since he discusses the more for-
mal aspects that Heidegger’s lecture courses purposely omit because 
they are “readily accessible everywhere” (ga 39: 7/6). According to 
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Dilthey, “the fullness and melodious flow of Hölderlin’s verses is un-
surpassed by any other writer.”15 Hölderlin’s poetic voice is marked by a 
strong rhythm, especially due to his study of Greek and Roman poetry, 
which inspired his adoption of ancient metrical forms for his hymns 
and elegies. As Dilthey notes, Hölderlin’s metrical variations produce a 
sensation as if “carried along as if by waves. By frequently weakening 
the first stressed syllable of the pentameter, he creates the impression 
of a crescendo” (sw 5: 377). The cadence of his verses rises and falls, the 
movement of which is often interrupted suddenly by an exclamation 
or enjoinder. These interruptions produce a syncopated rhythm, and 
Hölderlin fragments his poems further through his use of ambigu-
ous modifiers and unfinished phrases. As Alice Kuzniar describes his 
writing, “Hölderlin interrupts, complicates, and even at times suspends 
articulated language. He discovers a speech that maintains silence.”16 
 This rhythmic flow of silences and suspended moments means that 
the tempo of his poems privileges the caesura, a break or interruption.17 
Breaks in music and poetry are never simply silence, but are pregnant 
pauses where what came before and what is anticipated can resonate. A 
caesura emphasizes the relational dynamic between presence and non-
presence, i.e. the moment as an open space for the interplay of past and 
future. Dilthey thus describes Hölderlin’s musicality as a new lyrical 
form of poetry that “seems to emanate from indiscernible distances only 
to disappear in them again” (sw 5: 376). For Dilthey, as for Heid egger, 
Hölderlin’s poetry defies simple presence. His poetry resonates, emanates, 
and disappears again. Hölderlin’s rhythm thus describes temporality not 
as an ongoing flow or stream of now-moments, but as an interweaving 
of past, present, and future.
 Heidegger too describes the rhythm of Hölderlin’s poetry as a waxing 
and waning, a presencing that withdraws again, in his discussion of the 
poem “Germania.” In this lecture, Heidegger discusses how the rhythm 
(Schwingungsgefüge) of Hölderlin’s poem goes beyond the individual 
meters of each line and acts as a source of expression that reverberates 
through the entire poem from a primordial origin (vorausschwingende 
Ursprung) (ga 39: 14–15/17). This rhythm, as a movement of waxing 
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and waning, is also thematic in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s hymn 
“The Ister.” The river flows and in flowing intimates what is coming 
here before it vanishes into what is hidden. The river appears from pri-
mordial depths and then returns. Both the rhythm of the poem and the 
movement of the river suggest a particular way of understanding time. 
According to Dilthey, the rhythm and style of Hölderlin’s poetry conveys 
a moment that is filled with the past and anticipating the future (sw 5: 
304). The unfolding of Hölderlin’s lyrical verse continually evokes the 
past and future, which breaks from the idea of time as simply the present. 
This dynamic temporality, moreover, seems to be especially palpable in 
poetry. 
 Dilthey’s “Fragments for a Poetics” (1907–1908) examines the expe-
rience of time in relation to poetry.18 In these notes, Dilthey recognizes 
that time cannot simply be a continuum in which we continually ad-
vance from past to future – i.e. a linear timeline – because the present 
would be a mere “cross-section in this stream” which cannot be expe-
rienced (sw 5: 225). Instead, “lived experience is not merely something 
present, but already contains past and future within its consciousness 
of the present” (sw 5: 225).19 Given this aspect of the experience of 
time, Dilthey asks, “How then is the present really experienced?” and 
answers that
It is the nature of the present to be filled or ful-filled 
with reality in contrast to the representation of reality 
and its peculiar modifications either in memory or in 
the anticipation of reality and the will to realize it…
The present as experienceable is not this cross-section, 
but the continuously advancing being ful-filled with 
reality in the course of time (sw 5: 225).
The present is not a point that advances along a line from past to future. 
Rather, the present is the advancing fulfillment of reality that unifies 
past and future. 
 Dilthey contrasts Hölderlin’s fullness of time to Goethe’s complete 
submission to a single moment (sw 5: 370). Whereas Goethe’s poetic 
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time was of the present moment, Hölderlin’s poetry reflects the way 
in which the present is filled with and shaped by the past and future. 
Hölderlin “always lived in the context of his whole existence. His 
present feeling was constantly being influenced by what he had suf-
fered and by what might still happen” (sw 5: 370). Dilthey emphasizes 
Hölderlin’s sense of time in his poetry, which demonstrates that “the 
past has an efficacy just like the present” (sw 5: 370). Dilthey points to 
the “existence of the hermit Hyperion” who “is completely saturated by 
the spirits of what has been” and Empedocles who “feels the pressure of 
the past so strongly that he can only hope for liberation from it through 
death” (sw 5: 370). Hölderlin’s poems not only take up Greek myth and 
bear witness to the past, they also anticipate and envision a future. 
 For both Heidegger and Dilthey, Hölderlin poetizes the fullness of 
time and the mysterious gathering of past and future in the present. 
This gathering is recollection (Andenken), which Hölderlin considers 
the task of poetry. For Hölderlin the vocation of the poet is to recollect, 
i.e. to gather what cannot be complete and to understand the unity 
of this gathering without dissolving difference.20 Remembrance is not 
about simply holding onto the past for the present, which would assume 
time is a simple succession of moments to be collected. Instead, the poet 
gathers and preserves what has passed and what will come to pass in 
light of the now, which is incalculable and never the same. Remem-
brance is a type of calling to presence what it is not present, of wrestling 
with what is hidden. As Hölderlin tells us in “Remembrance”…
The current sweeps out. But it is the sea 
That takes and gives remembrance, 
And love no less keeps eyes attentively fixed, 
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